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The
Myth of Infantile Amnesia
By Chris Chatham
Freud famously suggested that infantile amnesia is an active suppression
of early traumatic memories. However, a review of the modern
cognitive literature suggests that at least in some ways, infantile
amnesia may actually be a myth.
Perhaps the most intuitive explanation
of infantile amnesia is simply that the infant's brain is not sufficiently
developed to
support episodic memory. However, substantial evidence argues
against this view. For example, the same factors that affect episodic
memory
in adults also affect infant memory, including age, retention
interval, context change, interference, study time, levels of processing,
and serial position effects. These factors influence performance
on a variety of infant memory tasks, including visual recognition
memory, mobile conjugate reinforcement, and the Rovee-Collier
train
task.
Adult-like memories may be formed
even in the womb. As reviewed by Hayne, 3-day-old infants were
capable of distinguishing a
particular passage (from Dr. Seuss's "Cat in the Hat") that had
been read to them twice daily for the last 6 weeks of gestation
from similar passages (matched for word count, length, and prosody).
What's more, these infants preferred the familiar passage even
if spoken by someone other than their mother, strongly suggesting
that they had encoded (and retained) a relatively high-level representation
of the passage's auditory content.
This and other evidence led Rovee-Collier
to argue that both the explicit and implicit memory systems are
functional very
early
in infancy. Therefore, it seems unlikely that infantile amnesia
can be explained solely by the immaturity of cognitive memory
systems.
But even if these memory systems
are functional in a rudimentary sense, it's still possible that
infantile amnesia results
from their immaturity. For example, these systems may be
highly
limited in retention interval. But here again, new evidence
suggests
that this too is insufficient for explaining infantile
amnesia: simple
nonverbal reminders of previous experiences seem sufficient
for supporting long-term memory in infants. As noted by
Hayne, 6-month-old
infants can demonstrate memory for a given experience even
more than a year later, if simply placed in the same location
as the
original experience. Similar results have been found with
infants as young as 8 weeks of age.
Therefore, infantile amnesia also
cannot be explained by an inability to remember over long delays.
Infants are
likely to encounter
numerous reminders of this variety throughout infancy,
just a few of which
are demonstrably sufficient for supporting long-term
memory.
Thus, infantile amnesia cannot be
explained solely by neurological immaturity (since both systems
appear to
be intact) nor
by inability to remember over long delays. Instead,
this inaccessibility
might
result from the profound differences between the kinds
of retrieval cues used by adults (i.e., verbal cues)
and those
that would
likely be required to retrieve a memory from preverbal
infant experience.
The alternative "reinstantiation" theory suggests that
while infant memories may exist, they cannot be successfully recalled
due to the massive synaptic pruning that takes place throughout
neocortex in early childhood. In either of these cases, the apparent
lack of early-life memory is due to its inaccessibility, rather
than an actual failure of retention.
A far more tantalizing conclusion
is hinted at by Rovee-Collier, who suggests that "contextual information disappears from
memories that have been reactivated once or twice." Therefore,
adult memory may actually contain some early life experiences,
but they simply cannot be identified as such due to a lack of source
memory.
In summary, there is some reason
to believe that the phenomenon of infantile amnesia has been widely
mischaracterized.
Infants show surprisingly robust long-term memories,
and
both the
explicit and implicit memory systems appear functional
very early in
life. Based on this evidence, it seems unlikely
that
retention failure
underlies the apparent loss of all early-life experiences.
Rather than being completely forgotten, our earliest
experiences may
actually be mislabeled.
Chris
Chatham is a graduate student at the University of Colorado,
Boulder, and author of the Developing
Intelligence weblog.
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