Steven
Pinker
Steven
Pinker is a prominent American experimental psychologist,
cognitive scientist and popular science writer known for
his spirited and wide-ranging defence of evolutionary psychology
and the computational theory of mind. Pinker’s academic
specializations are visual cognition and language development
in children. He argues that language is an "instinct" or
biological adaption shaped by natural selection rather than
a by-product of general intelligence. In his four books for
a general audience – The
Language of Instinct, How
the Mind Works, Words
and Rules and The
Blank Slate – Pinker suggests an evolutionary
mental module for language, although this idea remains controversial.
Pinker goes further than Chomsky, arguing many other human
mental faculties are evolved, and is an ally of Daniel
Dennett and Richard
Dawkins in many evolutionary disputes. In his latest book, The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature ,
Pinker investigates what the words we use tell us about the way we
think.

Related
Links
• Steven
Pinker's home page
• Biography
of Steven Pinker
• Steven
Pinker's Wikipedia page
• Gen
Kuroki's Website about Steven Pinker
• Louis
Menand's critique of The
Blank Slate by Steven Pinker
• Simon
Blackburn's critique of The
Blank Slate by Steven
Pinker
• Reason magazine
interview with Steven Pinker
• The Guardian profile
of Steven Pinker
• Edward
Oakes review of How
The Mind Works, by Steven Pinker
• Edge interview
with Steven Pinker
• Slate video
interview with Steven Pinker
• Wordsmith interview
with Steven Pinker
• Paper: Language
Acquisition, by Steven Pinker

Steven Pinker Quotes
Art works because it appeals to certain faculties
of the mind. Music depends on details of the auditory system, painting
and sculpture on the visual system. Poetry and literature depend
on language.
As many political writers have pointed out, commitment
to political equality is not an empirical claim that people are
clones.
By exploring the political and moral colorings
of discoveries about what makes us tick, we can have a more honest
science and a less fearful intellectual milieu.
I think that there is a quasi-religious theory
of human nature that is prevalent among pundits and intellectuals,
which includes both empirical assumptions about how the mind works
and a set of values that people hang on those assumptions.
If people are innately saddled with certain sins
and flaws, like selfishness, prejudice, sort-sightedness, and self-deception,
then political reform would seem to be a waste of time.
Most intellectuals today have a phobia of any
explanation of the mind that invokes genetics.
Personality and socialization aren't the same
thing.
Political equality consists of recognizing, as
the Constitution says, that people have certain inalienable rights,
namely life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Recognizing
those rights is not the same thing as believing that people are
indistinguishable in every respect.
There has to be innate circuitry that does the
learning, that creates the culture, that acquires the culture,
and that responds to socialization.
There's no reason that we should give up that
lever on people's behavior – namely, the inhibition systems of
the brain – just because we're coming to understand more about
the temptation systems.
Today there are movements in the arts to reintroduce
beauty and narrative and melody and other basic human pleasures.
And they are considered radical extremists!
Why do people believe that there are dangerous
implications of the idea that the mind is a product of the brain,
that the brain is organized in part by the genome, and that the
genome was shaped by natural selection?
Our goals are the subgoals of the ultimate goal
of the genes, replicating themselves.
Intelligence, then, is the ability to attain
goals in the face of obstacles by means of decisions based on rational
(truth
obeying) rules. The computer scientists Allen Newell and Herbert
Simon fleshed this idea out further by noting that intelligence
consists of specifying a goal, assessing the current situation
to see how it differs from the goal, and applying a set of operations
that reduce difference.
Who decides that this mark in this system
corresponds to that bit of the world? In the case of the computer,
the answer
is obvious: we get to decide what the symbols mean, because we
built the machine. But who means the meaning allegedly inside us?
Philosophers call this the problem of "intentionality" (confusingly,
because it has nothing to do with intentions). There are two common
answers. One [the causal theory] is that a symbol is connected
to its referent in the world by our sense organs. Your mother's
face
reflects light, which stimulates your eye, which triggers a cascade
of templates or similar circuits, which inscribe the symbol mother
in your mind. The other [the inferential role theory] answer is
that the unique pattern of symbol manipulations triggered by the
first symbol mirrors the unique patterns of relationships between
the referent of the first symbol and the referents of the triggered
symbols. Once we agree, for whatever reason, to say that mother
means mother, uncle means uncle, and so on, the new interlocking
kinship statements generated by the demons turn out to be uncannily
true, time and again.
For many physicists and mathematicians, natural
selection seems a repugnant kind of explanation, because it is
too kludgey. Its random stochastic variation, and selection by
utility seems like an ugly way to arrive at something beautiful,
and for a physicist or a mathematician, or someone like Noam Chomsky,
whose work has often been mathematical, the favored kind of theory
is one where a conclusion can be deduced from a bunch of premises
in an elegant deductive system. By the aesthetic of a grammarian,
or the aesthetic of a physicist, natural selection seems too ugly
and weak.

|